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6 DEC 1982

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OIC&E			
OHC			
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OPBC			
OA&E			X
OP			X
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SUSPENSE: <u>7 Dec</u> Date			
REMARKS:			

NO REFERRAL TO OSD. WAIVER
APPLIES

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS	X			
5	DDI				
6	DBA				
7	DDO				
8	DD&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IFD/OIS				
20	NEO/GPR	X			
21	ES		X		
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		Date			

Remarks:

Please provide comments to me
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
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301



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December 3, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP/DEFENSE POLICY MEMBERS
INTERAGENCY GROUP/DEFENSE POLICY MEMBERS

SUBJECT: SIG/DP Paper

Attached is the final version of the "U.S. Foreign Policy Goals and Military Forces" paper that was discussed at the SIG/DP meeting. I believe it accurately reflects the comments and revisions supplied by the SIG and IG members. With JCS and PA&E's help, I have removed the sections that were considered classified information. If you have major problems with this version, please let me know by December 8. If I don't hear from you I will consider that as concurrence. We can then use this document and/or portions of it for various DoD budget presentation purposes.

As the DoD FY 84 budget preparation process reaches its conclusion over the next few weeks, we will be preparing additional budget documents for public, media and Congressional purposes. When these drafts are sufficient for distribution, we will schedule the next IG/SIG/DP meeting.

Vince P.
Vincent Puritano

The Executive Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND MILITARY FORCES

I. The Reagan Administration's national security strategy:

A. Calls for careful integration of all aspects of U.S. national power (e.g., economic, diplomatic, etc., as well as military) and of allied capabilities in order to counter threats to free world vital interests.

B. Recognizes the dynamic expansion and global scope of such threats, particularly as reflected in Soviet capabilities.

C. Implicitly acknowledges that a military posture free of all risks is not fully achievable.

D. Aims to provide the principal elements of a robust military posture capable of supporting critical U.S. national security requirements by the end of the decade.

II. In view of the size of the task and implicit constraints, U.S. military forces and programs over the mid-term are structured to support the following high-priority policy goals:

A. Protect critical free world interests against Soviet and surrogate military coercion, especially in Europe, Southwest Asia, the Pacific basin, and Latin America.

1. Deter attack, and if deterrence fails, deny enemy military objectives and maintain the territorial integrity of our allies.

2. Preserve the free world's access to energy sources and other vital raw materials.

B. Deter nuclear attack on ourselves and our principal allies, while at the same time promoting meaningful and verifiable mutual reductions in nuclear weapons through negotiations with the Soviet Union. If deterrence fails, provide an appropriate response to deny Soviet military objectives.

III. How do our military forces and programs contribute to the achievement of these goals?

A. Our planning takes account of the growing military capabilities of our potential adversaries, particularly the Soviet Union. Such growth has occurred -- and is projected to continue -- on a global basis and in all mission areas.

B. To achieve our specific regional objectives, strong U.S. forward-deployed forces are necessary. These forces deter military attack, provide an initial and timely response to aggression or developing crises, and demonstrate U.S. commitment in regions of major concern. We have accordingly placed high priority on the readiness and sustainability of our forward-deployed forces.

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C. To meet our NATO goals, sufficient in-place ground and air units are required in Europe to deal with immediately-available Warsaw Pact forces, and substantial reinforcing units are necessary to contain follow-on Pact forces. The United States contributes four in-place Army divisions and seven Air Force fighter wings in NATO's Center Region, and is pledged to provide six reinforcing Army divisions and 12 Air Force wings within ten days of a decision to deploy. Currently we would be far short of these reinforcement objectives, but our prepositioning and strategic airlift programs -- complemented by planned improvements to Central Region airbases could bring us within 10-20% of our goal in a NATO-only scenario by the late 1980s.

D. On NATO's flanks, forces from the nations involved will have principal responsibility for conducting a defense, supported by forces from the U.S. and other allied nations. Planned acceleration of U.S., British, and Canadian reinforcements, coupled with modernization of Norwegian forces, will add about 25% to NATO's aggregate ground and tacair capability on the Northern Flank by the late 1980s; lesser but still substantial upgrading of Southern Flank tacair capability will be achieved by more rapid U.S. reinforcement and Turkish airbase improvements.

E. To preserve the West's access to Persian Gulf oil, we continue to maintain maritime forces in the Gulf and Arabian Sea, retain and are expanding our access to facilities, and conduct periodic exercises. We must also be prepared to insert rapidly sufficient forces to deter a Soviet invasion. We have the basic forces available today, although their use in Southwest Asia would be at the expense of other theaters. In addition, we lack some of the required support units and unique support equipment, and we could not get our forces to the region in a timely manner. Our program will gradually increase the size and supportability of our SWA-oriented forces. Major improvements planned to our strategic airlift and sealift, along with greater forward prepositioning efforts, will allow us to approximately double our deployment rate to the region.

F. In the Northwest Pacific we depend principally on forces of allied nations to meet regional security requirements. This is particularly true of the Korean peninsula, where the U.S. has one Army division and limited tacair forward deployed. One MAF is located on Okinawa and in Japan. In addition, naval and air forces are forward-deployed in these areas and elsewhere in the Pacific. As in NATO and Southwest Asia, our ability to deploy reinforcements will be improved by the airlift and sealift enhancements in the Defense program. However, since we have a limited pool of reinforcements for all theaters, our Pacific allies clearly must do more to develop their own defenses as resources permit.

G. In conjunction with our allies, we must be able to defend the sea lines of communication along which critical U.S. reinforcements and resupply travel to forward theaters, and to conduct offensive operations against Soviet naval forces and facilities. Accordingly, we have programmed a 20%+ increase to our deployable battle fleet -- with particular emphasis on tacair, cruise-missile, and amphibious projection capabilities -- by the end of the decade.

H. In Third World areas, low-intensity conflict and coercion threaten our access to strategic materials, endanger the security of our friends and allies, and outflank our traditional alliances. We must increase our security assistance and other efforts to respond to these crises.

I. To provide an adequate strategic nuclear deterrent, we must be capable of attacking the full range of Soviet targets. To hedge against the failure of any one system, we must also ensure that we can attack the most significant targets in a variety of ways. Achieving these objectives will require substantial modernization of our present force, which has received little new investment since the late 1960s. Such modernization includes all five elements of the President's strategic program. We also believe that this modernization is essential to achieving meaningful mutual arms reduction. We must not repeat the mistake of the 1970s, when we hoped that negotiations could substitute for modernization. That policy left us without an acceptable agreement -- and without a modern force.

IV. Under the Reagan Administration, the United States has served notice to both friends and adversaries that we intend to lead the free world's collective effort to counter Soviet global expansion through the end of this century and beyond.

A. The mid-term U.S. defense program constitutes tangible evidence of our purpose, our commitment to defend U.S. interests, and our support for allies.

B. This U.S. program, in combination with the increases in allied efforts it will encourage, will counteract projected growth in threats to our mutual interests.